The Stickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process by Gabriel, Richard L.
THE STRICKLAND STANDARD FOR CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
EMASCULATING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN THE
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RICHARD L. GABRIELt
As the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, "When a true ad-
versarial criminal trial has been conducted . . . the kind of testing en-
visioned by the sixth amendment has occurred." 1 Though many have
argued in favor of modifications of or alternatives to the adversarial
system,2 few, if any, have doubted the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the sixth amendment was intended to protect that system.' In the ideal
adversarial system," opposing attorneys present the strongest arguments
for their respective sides in equally competent manners. An impartial
third party determines from those arguments "the best answers to the
t B.A. 1984, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of Pennsylvania.
United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2045 (1984) (citations omitted).
Judge Frankel, for example, argues that the search for truth would be served
better by a reformed trial system. See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1052-59 (1975). Although Judge Frankel argues,
"[Olur adversary system rates truth too low among the values that institutions of justice
are meant to serve," id. at 1032, he prefers to reform rather than to abandon the
adversary system. Judge Frankel makes three proposals for reform. First, he calls for a
modification of the adversarial ideal. Second, he urges that truth be made a paramount
objective. Finally, he suggests imposing a duty upon the contestants to pursue this ob-
jective. Id. at 1052-59.
Professor Frank argues more forcefully against the adversarial system. See J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949). Professor Frank argues that the "fight"
theory upon which the adversarial system is based frequently "blocks the uncovering of
vital evidence or leads to a presentation of vital testimony in a way that distorts it." Id.
at 81. Arguing that truth is the goal of a judicial inquiry, Professor Frank suggests two
reforms in civil procedure that help to effectuate his "truth" theory and proposes an-
other. He lauds the then new device of discovery and encourages trial judges to make
more use of their authority to call witnesses. See id. at 93. He also suggests the ap-
pointment of impartial officials to do pre-trial investigation. See id. at 97-98.
3 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 2, at 1052 ("For most of us trained in American
Law, the superiority of the adversary process over any other is too plain to doubt or
examine."); Gorsky, The Adversary System, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 127, 130 (R.
Bronaugh ed. 1978) (In the courts, "the adversary system tends to be accepted without
much question.").
" Ideally, "an adversarial trial promotes decisions that are well grounded on both
the law and the facts because each side will, with partisan zeal, bring to the court's
attention all the material favorable to that side, and, therefore, no relevant considera-
tion will escape its notice." Golding, On The Adversary System and Justice, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL LAW 98, 106 (R. Bronaugh ed. 1978).
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disputed questions of fact." 5 Once the facts are established, the judge
applies the relevant legal authority to these facts, and justice is served.'
In the real world, however, the best that we can do is to ensure
that opposing counsel provide approximately equal representations of
their respective positions.' This notion has consistently led the Supreme
Court to hold that the "assistance of counsel"8 required for an accused
by the sixth amendment be "effective assistance of counsel."9 But what
level of professional performance constitutes effective assistance of
counsel?
In Strickland v. Washington,10 the Supreme Court formulated a
standard of ineffective assistance of counsel that would unify the dispa-
rate approaches of the state and federal courts. Writing for the Court,
Justice O'Connor developed a two-pronged test. In order to show inef-
fective assistance of counsel, a defendant first must show that the attor-
ney's representation fell below "an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.""1 Second, a defendant must prove that the attorney's inadequate
representation prejudiced the defendant. A defendant is prejudiced
when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."1 2
5 Id. at 108.
As Justice Cardozo explained:
[In] a system so highly developed as our own, precedents have so covered
the ground that they fix the point of departure from which the labor of the
judge begins. Almost invariably, his first step is to examine and compare
them. If they are plain and to the point, there may be need of nothing
more. Stare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of our law.
B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19-20 (1921).
See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case
will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free.").
a U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ("The effective assistance of coun-
sel . . . is a constitutional requirement of due process. . . ."); see also Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942) (stating that the sixth amendment guarantee
of "'assistance of counsel' " must be "untrammeled and unimpaired" by a court's inef-
fective appointment of counsel); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("The
Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal
appointment."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) ("[Iln a capital
case, . . . it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign coun-
sel . . . and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case.").
10 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
11 Id. at 2065.
12 Id. at 2068.
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This Comment argues that the two-pronged test for effective assis-
tance of counsel enunciated in Strickland undermines the goal of the
sixth amendment-a just result achieved through a proper adversarial
proceeding. The test eliminates the procedural requirement by which
the goal of a just result is to be attained. Absent the procedural require-
ment, the test allows a court to presume guilt before it is certain that
the accused has been convicted through the properly functioning
processes of the adversary system.
It should be noted that, throughout this Comment, "procedural
right" and "procedural requirement" refer to the sixth amendment's
enumerated protections. For example, representation by counsel is a
mechanism by which the rights of a criminal defendant are enforced. If
a criminal defendant is denied counsel, irrespective of a judge's percep-
tion of the impact of such a denial on the fairness of the trial result, the
defendant's rights have been violated.
Part I of this Comment reviews the Supreme Court's enunciation
of the effective assistance of counsel standard in Strickland v. Washing-
ton. Part II frames the effective assistance of counsel as a procedural
right and establishes the necessary relationship between this right and
the workings of the adversary system. Part III argues that the Strick-
land test emasculates the sixth amendment by substituting for the pro-
cedural guarantee of that amendment a substantive inquiry into the
fundamental fairness of the result of the trial. The analysis criticizes
the prejudice component of the Strickland test, which in theory eviscer-
ates the procedural right and in practice eliminates the defendant's op-
portunity to gain a new trial where ineffective assistance of counsel has
been rendered. Part IV proposes an alternative standard for the effec-
tive assistance of counsel that reflects a paramount commitment to the
tenets of the adversarial system, as reflected in the sixth amendment's
procedural guarantee. The standard calls for a new trial whenever inef-
fective assistance of counsel is rendered.
I. THE Strickland v. Washington LITIGATION
A. State Court Proceedings
In September of 1976, David Leroy Washington and two accom-
plices planned and committed three groups of crimes, which included
three brutal murders, torture, kidnapping, assaults, attempted murder,
attempted extortion, and theft."3 After his two accomplices were ar-
" See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1246-47 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Washington stabbed to death Mr. Pridgen, a minister. Three
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rested, Washington voluntarily surrendered to the police and confessed
to the third of the murders. Shortly thereafter, the state indicted Wash-
ington solely for this murder and appointed William Tunkey as his
attorney. 4
Ignoring the advice of his attorney, Washington subsequently con-
fessed to the other two murders. The state indicted Washington on
these additional counts, and a trial date was set. Washington waived his
right to a jury trial and, again ignoring his counsel's advice, pleaded
guilty to all of the charges in the indictments.1 5 During his plea collo-
quy, Washington explained that his actions were the "result of extreme
stress and anxiety due to his unemployment and his corresponding in-
ability to provide for his family," and he further stated that he had no
significant prior criminal record."8 Washington nonetheless accepted re-
sponsibility for his crimes. The trial judge responded that he had "a
great deal of respect for people who are willing to step forward and
admit their responsibility.)
1 7
Washington also waived his right to have a sentencing jury, choos-
ing instead to be heard by a judge.1" Prior to that hearing, Tunkey
spoke with Washington about his personal background; additionally, he
spoke with Washington's wife and mother on the telephone. Tunkey
sought no other character witnesses nor did he request a psychiatric
examination, as he found no indication that Washington had any psy-
chological problems.1 9 Tunkey decided not to present any evidence con-
cerning Washington's character and emotional state, believing the pos-
sibility of overcoming the evidentiary effects of Washington's
confessions to be hopeless.20 Tunkey decided instead to rely on the plea
colloquy and the trial judge's statement acknowledging respect for those
who admit their responsibility.2 By presenting no new evidence,
Tunkey prevented the state from cross-examining Washington with re-
gard to his claims of emotional distress and the absence of a significant
prior criminal record, and he blocked any state attempt to introduce
psychiatric evidence of its own.22 The sentencing judge found numerous
days later, Washington killed Mrs. Birk and severely wounded three of her family
members. Finally, Washington and an accomplice kidnapped and killed Mr. Meti, a
college student, after attempting to extort money from the student's parents. Id.
"I See id. at 1247.
15 See id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2057 (1984).
20 See id.
1 See id.
22 See id.
[Vol. 134:1259
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
aggravating factors and no mitigating factors and sentenced Washing-
ton to death on each of the capital murder counts.23 The Florida Su-
preme Court upheld the conviction and sentences on direct appeal.24
Washington subsequently sought collateral relief in state court on
numerous grounds, including the allegation that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing. Washington asserted
that his counsel was ineffective because "he failed to move for a contin-
uance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to in-
vestigate and present character witnesses, to seek a presentence investi-
gation report, to present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge,
and to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the
medical experts."'25 The trial court rejected all six of Washington's
challenges.2" The Florida Supreme Court affirmed this denial of re-
lief,217 holding that Washington failed to make out a prima facie case
either of "substantial deficiency or possible prejudice" and that he
"failed to such a degree that we believe, to the point of a moral cer-
tainty, that he is entitled to no relief."
28
B. Proceedings in the Lower Federal Courts
Washington next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, again
alleging the denial of effective assistance of counsel.2" The district court
concluded that there did not appear to be a likelihood, or even a signifi-
cant possibility, that any errors of Washington's trial attorney affected
23 See id. at 2058.
24 Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937
(1979).
25 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2058 (1984). In support of these
claims, Washington submitted 14 affidavits from friends, neighbors, and relatives stat-
ing that they would have served as character witnesses. He also submitted one psychiat-
ric and one psychological report stating that he was "chronically frustrated and de-
pressed because of his economic dilemma" at the time he committed his crimes. Id.
26 See id. at 2059. The trial court found:
[A]s a matter of law, the record affirmatively demonstrates that even if
[counsel] had done each of the . . . things [that respondent alleged coun-
sel had failed to do] at the time of sentencing, there is not even the remot-
est chance that the outcome would have been any different. The plain fact
is that the aggravating circumstances proved in this case were completely
overwhelming ....
Petition for Cert. at app. A230, quoted in 104 S. Ct. at 2052.
27 Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
28 Id. at 287.
29 See Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2060 (1984). Washington re-
peated the allegations of error that he pleaded in state court, except for the allegation of
counsel's failure to move for a continuance.
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the outcome of the sentencing hearing, and the court denied Washing-
ton's petition.3"
Washington appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. That court held that a defendant must show that "but
for his counsel's ineffectiveness his trial, but not necessarily its outcome,
would have been altered in a way helpful to him." 1 Further, the court
held that, even if the petitioner meets this burden, the court must ex-
amine the error within the framework of the harmless error rule.32
Consequently, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded to the district court for consideration in light of its own stan-
dard of ineffective assistance of counsel.33
This decision was vacated when the Fifth Circuit decided to hear
the case en banc.3 4 The full court of appeals developed yet a different
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, 5 and remanded for con-
sideration in light of its newly enunciated test. 6
C. The Supreme Court Case
Washington subsequently petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme
Court. Noting that the various tests, especially the prejudice tests, in
the lower courts differed drastically, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari37 "to consider the standards by which to judge a contention that the
'0 See id. (quoting Petition for Cert at app. A285-86).
31 Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1982).
32 See id. at 902. The harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967), is discussed infra notes 93-115 and accompanying text.
33 See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 879 (5th Cir. 1982).
Washington v. Strickland, 679 F.2d 23 (1982) (ordering rehearing en banc).
See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1258 (5th Cir. 1982). First, the
defendant must prove that his "right to effective assistance of counsel was violated."
Where defense counsel claims to have made a "strategic choice to channel his investiga-
tion into fewer than all plausible lines of defense," a defendant must prove that the
assumptions underlying the strategic choice were unreasonable. Id. at 1256. Where
defense counsel failed to conduct "a substantial investigation into plausible lines of de-
fense for reasons other than strategic choice," the attorney will be held to have rendered
ineffective assistance. Id. at 1257-58. Once a defendant has shown such a violation of
the right to effective assistance of counsel, it must be shown that the defendant suffered
sufficient prejudice. The court divided the burden of proving prejudice between the
defendant and the state. The defendant must first show that "the ineffective assistance
[of counsel] created not only 'a possibility of prejudice, but that [it] worked to his actual
and substantial disadvantage.'" Id. at 1258 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 170 (1982)). If the defendant carries that burden, the state must then prove that
"counsel's ineffectiveness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. The court ex-
plicitly rejected a rule of per se prejudice, see id. at 1258-60, finding such a rule "espe-
cially inappropriate in the case of ineffective assistance because the state is not responsi-
ble for the violation of the petitioner's rights." Id. at 1260.
s See id. at 1263-64.
3 Strickland v. Washington, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
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Constitution requires that a criminal judgment be overturned because
of the actual ineffective assistance of counsel."3
The Court in Strickland v. Washington began by stating that the
purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance of
counsel is to "ensure a fair trial."3 9 In the Court's view, a fair trial has
been denied where "counsel's conduct so undermined the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result."40 Based upon these premises, the Strick-
land Court enunciated a two-pronged test: first, a defendant must show
that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." '41 To satisfy this
prong of the test "the defendant must show that counsel's representa-
tion fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 4 Second, "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense."4 To prove such prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A rea-
sonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.'
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). It is noteworthy that,
although the federal court proceedings in Strickland were federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, the majority held that "the principles governing ineffectiveness claims should
apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a
new trial." Id. at 2070.
" Id. at 2064. This Comment argues that the Court's assumption is incorrect, for
the procedural rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment are to be protected in and of
themselves. See infra notes 48-80 and accompanying text. It is only through these pro-
cedures that a fair trial (i.e. one that does justice) can be achieved. In fact, a fair trial
might very well be defined as a trial in which all of an accused's procedural lights have
been protected. Thus Justice Marshall wrote, "[T]he constitutional guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel . . . functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only
through fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Simi-
larly, Justice Black wrote, "The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition
that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.'"
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (footnote omitted).
Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
41 Id.
"' Id. at 2065. This equation of "errors so serious" with an "objective standard of
reasonableness" troubled Justice Marshall. In dissent, he noted the majority's sugges-
tion that reviewing courts recognize a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was
adequate, see id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2065-66), and argued
that such a suggestion might be read as imposing upon defendants "an unusually
weighty burden of persuasion." Id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 2064. The Court did, however, note that prejudice is presumed in certain
sixth amendment claims, for example, where there was an "[a]ctual or constructive
denial of the assistance of counsel altogether" and where counsel was "burdened by an
actual conflict of interest." Id. at 2067.
44 Id. at 2068. Unlike the court of appeals below, the Supreme Court did not
discuss the harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Appar-
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The majority warned that the enunciated standards did not estab-
lish "mechanical rules," but were intended to aid in the decision mak-
ing process. 45 The majority concluded that the "ultimate focus of in-
quiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose
result is being challenged." '46 Applying these principles, the majority
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the district
court properly declined to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AS A PROCEDURAL RIGHT
A. A Just End Depends on Just Means
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington places consistent
emphasis on one's sixth amendment right to fundamental fairness,
which it equates with a just result. The Court's sixth amendment inter-
pretation is inadequate because it suggests that the end justifies the
means in the precise circumstance where the legitimacy of the end is
dependent on the legitimacy of the means. One who is clearly guilty,
the Court implies, should not be exonerated because counsel was
clearly ineffective. The "correct" result is thus elevated above the
means by which this result is to be achieved. Such a proposition is in
direct conflict with the theoretical basis of the adversarial system: one
cannot know the "correct" result without first allowing the process to
operate properly. In the adversarial system, the result of a trial in
which a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel
should have no legitimacy.
The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
ently, once a defendant meets the prejudice test, the defendant has shown that counsel's
errors were harmful beyond a reasonable doubt. See Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
The Strickland standard represents the Supreme Court's attempt to unify the ap-
proaches of the lower federal courts and the state courts, which were severely divided
on the issue of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g. Maryland v.
Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978), denying cert. to 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977)
(White, J., dissenting) (stating that the circuits were in "disarray" on the question).
"' Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 2071.
[Vol. 134:1259
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.48
Any undertaking to determine the meaning of these words is lim-
ited by the lack of a historical record, for "[n]either in the Congress
which proposed what became the Sixth Amendment guarantee that the
accused is to have the assistance of counsel nor in the state ratifying
conventions is there any indication of the understanding which these
men brought to the language employed." '49 Nonetheless, the historical
meaning of the sixth amendment is ascertainable through the Framers'
statements about the Bill of Rights in general. The Bill of Rights was
intended as a means of ensuring the "unalienable rights" 50 of individ-
ual citizens. 51 The declaratory and restrictive clauses that comprise the
48 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
49 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1215 (1973). Justice Brennan recently criticized "those who find legitimacy in
fidelity to what they call 'the intentions of the Framers.'" He argued:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we
can: as 20th century Americans. We look to the history of the time of
framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate
question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time.
For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it
might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of
its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
Excerpts of Speech on Constitution, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at 36, col. 3. Attorney
General Edwin Meese III responded harshly to Justice Brennan's comments:
The Constitution is not a legislative code bound to the time in which it
was written . . . . Neither, however, is it a mirror that simply reflects the
thoughts and ideas of those who stand before it.
Where the language of the Constitution is specific, it must be
obeyed . . . . Where there is ambiguity as to the precise meaning . . . it
should be interpreted and applied in a manner as to at least not contradict
the text of the Constitution itself.
High Court is Hit Anew by Meese, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 16, 1985, at 4-A, col. 4.
It is ironic that the traditional liberal view espoused by Justice Brennan allowed the
Court in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), to dilute one of the rights
of the accused for which liberals have long advocated. See infra notes 81-92 and accom-
panying text.
80 These "unalienable rights" were "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
The Declaration of Independence preamble (U.S. 1776).
" Although, to be sure, many disagreed with him, see, e.g., 2 J. ELLIOT, THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILA-
DELPHIA IN 1787, at 436, 445 (2d ed. 1836) (James Wilson believed that a bill of
rights is "by no means a necessary measure. In a government possessed of enumerated
powers, such a measure would be not only unnecessary, but preposterous and danger-
ous."), Patrick Henry stated, in arguing for a Bill of Rights, "If you intend to reserve
your unalienable rights, you must have the most express stipulation." 3 J. ELLIOT,
supra, at 445. Finding that the American people "thought a Bill of Rights necessary,"
3 J. Elliot, supra at 317 (statement of Mr. Henry), the first Congress adopted the
following resolution: "The conventions of a number of states having at the time of their
19861
1268 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Bill of Rights protect these rights.
The sixth amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, is also a
means of protecting the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness. The statements of the Framers support such a con-
clusion. Patrick Henry said, "Trial by jury is the best appendage of
freedom"52 and supported a jury trial for "its essentiality to the preser-
vation of liberty."53 Similarly, James Madison, who wrote the words
that became the sixth amendment,54 stated, "Trial by jury . . . is as
essential to secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-exis-
tent rights of nature."55 But Madison went further in discussing one's
right to a jury trial; he included the "other accustomed requisites" of
such a right.56 One of these requisites was the "assistance of counsel for
[one's] defence." 5
Contemporary jurists and commentators have argued that sixth
amendment rights, particularly the right to counsel, are vehicles by
which substantive constitutional rights are comprehensively protected.
For example, Judge Schaefer noted the symbiotic relationship between
the right to counsel and other rights: "Of all the rights that an accused
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may
have."58 Similarly, Justice Brennan pointed out that the right to coun-
sel exists "not only to equalize the sides in an adversary criminal pro-
cess, but also to give substance to other constitutional and procedural
protections afforded criminal defendants."59 Finally, in Powell v. Ala-
bama, the Supreme Court stated, "The right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel." 60 Thus, the procedural rights of the sixth amendment, in
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or
abuse of its power, [resolved] that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be
added . . ." 1 J. ELLIOT, supra, at 338.
11 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 51, at 324.
53 Id. at 544.
" B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1027
(1971).
55 Id. at 1029.
56 Id. at 1027.
5" Id. Thomas Paine agreed that "the civil right of pleading by proxy, that is, by a
council [sic], is an appendage to the natural right [to plead one's cause]." 1 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 51, at 316.
58 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1956); see also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978) ("In an adversary sys-
tem of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance
of counsel.").
'9 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 377 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
60 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
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and of themselves, are the criminal defendant's constitutional guarantee
of fairness.
B. The Adversary System Requires Absolute Protection of the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The pronounced commitment of the American legal system to the
adversarial process 1 necessitates a conclusion that procedural rights
must be protected in their own right. In particular, the adversarial sys-
tem fundamentally relies on the effective performance of counsel:
[The adversarial] system proceeds on the assumption that the
best way to ascertain the truth is to present to an impartial
judge or jury a confrontation between the proponents of con-
flicting views, assigning to each the task of marshalling and
presenting the evidence for its side in as thorough and per-
suasive a way as possible. . . . The judge or jury is given
the strongest case that each side can present, and is in a posi-
tion to make an informed, considered, and fair judgment.2
61 See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
183 (1968) (calling the adversary system "the fundamental instrument for judicial judg-
ment"); Golding, supra note 4, at 117 ("[T]he adversary system is still the best way of
protecting a defendant's procedural rights, or . . . at least a good way of protecting
these rights."). Golding also noted, "[T]he adversary system is an efficient method for
getting the best answers humanly possible in the trial context, or at least no worse
answers than would be gotten through any other method that it would be reasonable to
employ at trials." Id. at 108. Some commentators question the adversarial system's
efficacy as a method for seeking the "Truth." See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 2, at 1032.
The institutional legal system, however, remains committed to the adversarial model
and defends its truth seeking methods:
[Piroperly directed and purged of obvious abuses, the juxtaposition of
two contrary perspectives, the impact of challenge and counter-proof, often
discloses to a neutral intelligence the most likely structure of Truth. Thus,
at least in those instances . . . where neither side knows certainly the ac-
tual contours of a past occurrence, I conclude that the adversarial encoun-
ter, for all its hazards, serves as one of the better methods of
reconstruction.
Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Fran-
kel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1067 (1975); see also Barrett, The Adversary
System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 479, 480 (1962) (citation
omitted). Barrett notes:
[T]he truth of the controversy between the parties to a lawsuit stands a
reasonably fairer chance of coming out when each side fights as hard as it
can to see to it that all the evidence most favorable to it and every rule of
law supporting its theory of the case are before the court.
Id. at 480.
62 Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1060, 1065
(1975).
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Recognition of the fundamental role of effective assistance of coun-
sel in the American legal system underlies the Court's view that a de-
fendant's sixth amendment right to "assistance of counsel" implies a
right to "the effective assistance of counsel."'6 3 As Judge Bazelon wrote,
"[T]he Supreme Court recognized that the sixth amendment demands
more than placing a warm body with a legal pedigree next to an indi-
gent defendant. ' 64 For the adversarial system to work properly, a de-
fendant's lawyer must exhibit "entire devotion," "warm zeal," and the
"'utmost learning" in her client's cause.65 When an attorney fails to
provide such assistance, the sixth amendment is violated because "inef-
fective representation is the same as no representation at all. Other as-
pects of the trial that may have mitigated the prejudicial effect of poor
representation-for example, a fair and competent judge-are irrele-
vant since the only issue is whether the defendant was denied a funda-
mental sixth amendment right." 6
The mere presence of counsel at trial satisfies neither the goals of
the adversary system nor, more importantly, the requirements of the
sixth amendment. As the Supreme Court held in Avery v. Alabama, a
case involving a challenge to the effectiveness of appointed counsel:
[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to confer,
to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, could
convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing
more than a formal compliance with the Constitution's re-
quirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel.
The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot
"3 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). The right to effective
assistance of counsel is generally traced to Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
where the Supreme Court held that a court's duty to appoint counsel "as a necessary
requisite of due process of law . . . is not discharged by an assignment at such a time
or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case." Id. at 71 (emphasis added). The Court in Powell based this
conclusion on the fact that "the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real
sense." Id. at 57. Thus, the Court wrote in McMann, "It has long been recognized that
the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 397 U.S. at 771
n.14 (citing cases collected supra note 9). The Court in Strickland v. Washington, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), accepted this conclusion.
64 Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEo. L.J. 811, 818-19
(1976); see also Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984) ("That a
person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not
enough to satisfy the constitutional command.").
65 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 15 (1980); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1982) ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.").
6" Smithburn & Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In Quest of a Uni-
form Standard of Review, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 497, 503 (1981).
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be satisfied by mere formal appointment.17
Formal compliance with the Constitution, without active representation
of a client's interests, is as much a violation of a sixth amendment pro-
cedural right as the denial of any assistance at all.8
In his dissenting opinion in Strickland, Justice Marshall inter-
preted the majority's holding to imply "that the Sixth Amendment is
not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after a trial
in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney.""9
Such a standard, which "results in no reversal for ineffective assistance
in cases of 'overwhelming guilt[,J' does not fulfill the basic requirement
of a working adversary model-a fair contest between equals. '70 Sim-
ply stated, an appellate court's determination that a defendant is
"clearly guilty" cannot act as a substitute for a trial that has failed to
establish guilt through fair procedures.7
As Judge Bazelon noted, this "guilty anyhow" syndrome "has
played a major role in perpetuating ineffective representation '72 for it
allows reviewing courts to excuse acts and omissions by counsel "with
the magic words 'tactical decision,' without inquiring as to whether the
lawyer even thought about the problem, or whether his thinking was
informed by a knowledge of the relevant law and facts." 73 In other
words, the difficult burden of proving prejudice that the Court in
Strickland v. Washington places on the defendant allows a court to
sweep attorney incompetence under the rug of a conviction that was
affirmed because a defendant could not prove prejudice. The attorney's
incompetence is quietly forgotten. As one commentator noted, "It is al-
ways possible in retrospect to fashion a justification for the failure to
perform a certain act when the defendant appears to be factually
guilty."7  The Court in Strickland exemplifies the willingness to sacri-
fice the requirements of the sixth amendment to the desire to protect
67 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
" See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ("The effective assistance of
counsel . . . is a constitutional requirement of due process of law.").
69 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2077 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
70 Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1166 "(1982).
11 See also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(b) at 262
(1984) (A result-oriented test converts an appellate court into the trier of fact and fails
to recognize that the defendant has a right to a fair trial even when he is clearly
guilty.).
72 Bazelon, supra note 64, at 825.
73 Id. at 828.
Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense
Counsel: A New Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752, 768
(1980).
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the tactical decisions of lawyers.
To be sure, an attorney must not be hindered in her planning of
trial strategy. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Strickland,
however, the majority's requirements that reviewing courts "indulge a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct" was constitutionally ade-
quate 75 and that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential176 suggest the imposition upon defendants of "an un-
usually weighty burden of persuasion."7 Lawyers, who frequently
must make tactical decisions, may in fact occasionally make poor ones.7 8
If these inadequate decisions deny a defendant the effective assistance of
counsel, the defendant is denied a basic guarantee of the adversarial.
system, which is theoretically the protector of fair trials. If the adver-
sarial system has failed to function properly 71 the sixth amendment
requires reversal, regardless of the effects on the crowded docket of the
courts.80
III. THE Strickland TEST'S EMASCULATION OF
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Incorporation Should Not Diminish the Protections
of the Sixth Amendment
The theory that subordinates the explicit procedural right of assis-
tance of counsel to the substantive "right" to a fair trial8" can be traced
7' Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
76 Id. at 2065.
7 Id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78 See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 1, 22-
23 (1973) ("I have often been told that if my court were to reverse every case in which
there was inadequate counsel, we would have to send back half the convictions in my
jurisdiction.").
" See Bazelon, supra note 64, at 823. Judge Bazelon argues, "Ineffectiveness is
neither a judgment of the motives or abilities of lawyers nor an inquiry into culpabil-
ity." Id. at 822-23. Rather, "[tihe concern is simply whether the adversary system has
functioned properly: the question is not whether the defendant received the assistance of
effective counsel but whether he received the effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 823.
This framing of the issue obviates a concern for the integrity of the lawyering profes-
sion because it shifts the emphasis from the attorney's general competence to the attor-
ney's behavior in a specific set of circumstances and that behavior's effect on the adver-
sarial process.
10 See id. at 821 ("[If the courts gave the sixth amendment real bite, we judges
would have to swallow the bitter pill of reversing an uncomfortably large number of
convictions and releasing large numbers of defendants from their guilty pleas. Even if
reversals and releases would not be that frequent, the spectre of a flood of frivolous
ineffectiveness claims haunts many judges.").
" Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984) ("[T]he Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to
a fair trial.").
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to the incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.82 The due process protection of
the right to counsel focuses on the defendant's right to "fundamental
fairness" in the result.83 The sixth amendment right, on the other
hand, is a "procedural guarantee to which an ad hoc balancing of inter-
ests is inappropriate."8 4 The purpose of incorporating the sixth amend-
ment into the fourteenth amendment was to make the amendment ap-
plicable to the states.8 5 It does not require, suggest, or even allow for
8" As the Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)
(quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)), the fourteenth amendment
"embraced" the "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions[,]' . . . although [they were] specifically dealt with
in another part of the Federal Constitution." Since the rights contained in the Bill of
Rights have been held to be of this fundamental nature, see, e.g., Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (fourteenth amendment incorporates first amendment free-
doms of speech and press); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41
(1897) (incorporation of the fifth amendment just compensation requirement), they
have been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
result of this incorporation is that a defendant's right to counsel is protected under the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as well as under the sixth
amendment.
Although the sixth amendment guarantees the procedural right of counsel for one's
defense, the due process clauses have extended the content of "defense" beyond the
scope of the trial proper. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to
counsel at preliminary hearing); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (right to
counsel at arraignment); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (right to counsel at
sentencing stage). These decisions were based on dicta in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 57 (1932): "[Dluring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . .
that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation [are] vitally impor-
tant, the defendants . . . [are] as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] during that
period as at the trial itself."
83 Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 1053, 1054-55 (1980). Thus, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), over-
ruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Supreme Court, holding that
the fourteenth amendment did not incorporate the sixth amendment, noted that a de-
fendant's due process right to counsel is violated only where "the totality of facts in a
given case" suggest that the denial of counsel "constitute[s] a denial of fundamental
fairness . . . . " The Betts Court further noted that "[tihe phrase [due process of law]
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights." Id.
"' Note, supra note 83, at 1056 (footnote omitted). Various commentators thus
have argued that the procedures enunciated in the sixth amendment should be goals in
and of themselves. See id. at 1069 ("The Sixth Amendment's right to coun-
sel . . . seeks to preserve procedural rights in the criminal context.") (footnote omit-
ted); Note, supra note 74, at 767 (The overall concern of the adversary system for
fairness "sometimes dictates that a guilty verdict be overturned, notwithstanding over-
whelming evidence of guilt, because the procedure for obtaining that verdict was unfair.
This is one rationale behind the exclusionary rule, for example.") (footnote omitted).
But see W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, § 11.10(a) at 94 ("The adversary
process, it is argued, is not a goal in itself, but a means adopted to best achieve the basic
objective of a fair fact-finding process that protects the innocent.").
8" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-41 (1963).
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judicial modification or erosion of the amendment's protections.
The sixth amendment lists specific"6 ingredients that, in combina-
tion, constitute a fair or reliable trial. It is questionable, then, whether
a fair or reliable trial can be achieved when one of these ingredients is
missing. In other words, one must ask whether the sixth amendment
protects absolutely the procedural rights that its language sets forth, or
whether it protects the substantive "right" to a fair trial that these pro-
cedural rights collectively create.
7
By incorporating the sixth amendment into the fourteenth amend-
ment right to fundamental fairness, the Court has permitted the elimi-
nation of the counsel ingredient. Such an approach8" has been strongly
criticized. 9 In his dissent in Gilbert v. California, Justice Black wrote:
The Framers did not declare in the Sixth Amendment that a
defendant is entitled to a "fair trial," nor that he is entitled
to counsel on the condition that this Court thinks there is
more than a "minimal risk" that without a lawyer his trial
will be "unfair." The Sixth Amendment settled that a trial
without a lawyer is constitutionally unfair ....
8 Cf. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 13 (1980) ("Constitutional provisions
exist on a spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-
textured.").
87 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) ("[T]he prosecutor will not
have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) ("[C]ounsel's absence might derogate from
the accused's right to a fair trial."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren,
C.J., concurring) ("[Tihe public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment is. . . a nec-
essary component of an accused's right to a fair trial . . . ."); see also Evitts v. Lucey,
105 S. Ct. 830, 836 (1985) (Counsel is required "to assist the defendant to obtain a fair
decision on the merits."); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984)
("The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a de-
fendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceed-
ing."); United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046 (1984) ("Absent some effect of
challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee is generally not implicated."); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963)
(sixth amendment right to counsel fundamental to a fair trial).
"8 The Supreme Court opinions suggest that the sixth amendment protects the
right to a fair trial, rather than the individual procedural requirements. See United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27
(1967); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
11 See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, § 11.7(c), at 67 n.22 ("Commen-
tators have argued that this emphasis upon the totality of the circumstances reflects a
failure of the courts to recognize that ineffectiveness claims in a post-Gideon era are
based upon the Sixth Amendment right to counsel rather than the 'fundamental fair-
ness' analysis of pre-Gideon due process.") (citing Note, supra note 83, at 1054-69 and
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Lingering Debate, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
659, 671-72 (1980)); see also Note, supra note 74, at 752 ("[T]he defendant has a
constitutional right to adequate procedural safeguards.").
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I think it far safer for constitutional rights for this
Court to adhere to constitutional language like "the accused
shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence"
instead of substituting the words not mentioned, "the accused
shall have the assistance of counsel only if the Supreme
Court thinks it necessary to assure a fair trial."90
The incorporation of the sixth amendment into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment has enabled courts to develop a
balancing framework which, in effect, has been used to dilute the guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel.
Justice Black has also noted:
The Court considers the "right to a fair trial" to be the over-
riding "aim of the right to counsel," . . . and somehow be-
lieves that this Court has the power to balance away the con-
stitutional guarantee of right to counsel when the Court
believes it unnecessary to provide what the Court considers a
"fair trial." But I think this Court lacks constitutional power
thus to balance away a defendant's absolute right to counsel
which the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee
him. 1
The remedy for this apparent dilemma sounds almost too simplistic: by
protecting the explicit procedural right to counsel enunciated in the
sixth amendment, fairness is achieved and the requirements of both the
sixth and fourteenth amendments are satisfied. 2 There is no tension
1o 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted). Golding states:
"[Ijrrespective of whether a trial aims at truth discovery or something else,
justice requires that the parties be given a fair trial of their cause. This
means that the rights, especially the procedural rights, of the litigant or
defendant should be protected throughout the proceedings .... [Tihe
adversary system is a necessary ingredient in a fair trial; a fair trial is an
adversarial trial.
Golding, supra note 4, at 116.
John Hart Ely has adopted such a view, albeit in stronger language than that of
Justice Black. Ely rejects the view that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment protects a substantive right such as the right to a fair trial. Ely argues, "There is
simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' No evidence
exists that 'process' meant something different a century ago from what it does
now . . . ... J. ELY, supra note 86, at 18. It follows, then, that the "proper function of
the Due Process Clause [is the] guaranteeing [of] fair procedures." Id. at 19.
"1 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 279 (1967) (Black, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
92 One commentator argues that the substantive component provided by the due
process clause is not the right to a fair trial, but rather a substantive right to effective
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between preserving the procedural right and allowing the due process
clause to operate fully.
B. Prejudice-An Incorrect Inquiry
The procedural rights protected by the sixth amendment are con-
sistent with the interest in fair trials protected by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments only where a fair trial
is defined by the procedures expressed in the sixth amendment. The
Court in Strickland adopted such a view: "The Constitution guaran-
tees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of
the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel Clause . . . ."" The
Court in Strickland properly adopted a standard for ineffective assis-
tance that focuses on the procedural aspects 6F a" trial: counsel's repre-
sentation must not fall "below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness.""' Having adopted such a standard, the Supreme Court
paradoxically added a result-oriented prejudice test that would allow a
reviewing court to hold a trial fair even after a defendant showed a
denial of the effective assistance of counsel.
The Court in Strickland noted that the issue in a sixth amend-
ment case is whether the procedure was fair-that is, "whether the
defendant was denied a fundamental sixth amendment right" 95-and
not whether the outcome of the proceeding was fair. As one commenta-
tor argued, since the sixth amendment "seeks to preserve procedural
assistance of counsel:
[A]Il formulations of the right [to effective assistance of counsel] are an
amalgam of two characterizations, one procedural or dignitary, the other
substantive. The procedural characterization endows the right to effective
assistance of counsel with an abstract importance, independent of the im-
pact of the infringement of that right on the reliability of the verdict; the
substantive characterization of the right views it as concerned only with
the impact of ineffective counsel on the outcome of the trial.
Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial
Guarantee, 50 U. CmI. L. REv. 1380, 1385 (1983).
The commentator's own definitions of the procedural and substantive rights are
contradictory. It is difficult to understand how any amalgam of rights can comprise a
single right to effective assistance of counsel. Any such amalgam would permit a judge
to focus on the impact of the outcome of a trial in one case and on the procedural right,
with its "abstract importance" in the next. Such an argument would actualize Justice
Black's fears of a court balancing away a defendant's rights. See supra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text.
93 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984).
94 Id. at 2065.
95 Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 66, at 503.
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rights in the criminal context,"96 courts should determine whether a
defendant has received effective assistance "without regard to the fair-
ness or reliability of the proceedings as a whole."'97 Another commenta-
tor has made a similar argument by relying on the due process clause:
"Before we will permit the state to deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, we require that certain processes which ensure regard for
the dignity of the individual be followed, irrespective of their impact on
the determination of truth.""8 The prejudice inquiry, which the Court
appears to deem the true determinant of whether a trial is fair, is inap-
propriate in the context of defining a defendant's sixth amendment
rights.
Even if a prejudice requirement is justifiable, placing the burden
of proving prejudice on the defendant is inappropriate for two reasons.
First, placing the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant, as the
Strickland Court has done, reverses the usual presumption that a de-
fendant is innocent until proven guilty. In United States v. DeCoster
[DeCoster I]" 9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted:
A requirement that the defendant show prejudice . . . shifts
the burden [of proving his case] to him and makes him estab-
lish the likelihood of his innocence. It is no answer to say
that the appellant has already had a trial in which the gov-
ernment was put to its proof because the heart of his com-
plaint is that the absence of the effective assistance of counsel
has deprived him of a full adversary trial.100
In general, where a defendant appeals the conviction, the defendant has
the burden of proving the claim. The defendant has had her "day in
court."10 1 This assumes, however, that the defendant's day in court was
a meaningful one-one that included "effective assistance of counsel on
that day." I0 2
To presume that a defendant is guilty before the defendant has
been convicted through the properly functioning procedures guaranteed
by the sixth amendment is to undermine the fair adversarial trial that
the Court in Strickland purports to protect.108 Thus, assuming that a
96 Note, supra note 83, at 1069.
7 Id.
" Freedman, supra note 62, at 1065.
9" 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (opinion of Bazelon, C.J.).
100 Id. at 1204.
101 Bazelon, supra note 78, at 27.
102 Id.
103 The Court in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984), stated:
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prejudice test was justifiable, where a convicted defendant shows that
her attorney failed to provide effective assistance of counsel, the defend-
ant has been denied a fair trial and the conviction must be presumed
invalid unless the prosecution "can show beyond a reasonable doubt
why it should not be.' 1 0 4 Holding otherwise would be to require a de-
fendant to prove that the prosecution has failed to prove its case, a
notion contrary to a system of justice that requires the prosecution to
prove every element of that case.' 05
Second, still assuming that a prejudice requirement could be justi-
fied in effective assistance of counsel cases, placing the burden of prov-
ing prejudice on the defendant, as the Supreme Court has done in
Strickland, effectively-shifts the burden of proving harmless error from
the state to the defendant. In Chapman v. California,"' the Supreme
Court held that, although some constitutional rights are "so basic to a
fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless er-
ror,"' 0 7 "there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of
a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may,
consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not re-
quiring the automatic reversal of the conviction."' 08 Proof of a constitu-
tional error, however,
casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a
burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason
that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the
burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that
there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously
obtained judgment.' 09
The court of appeals in Strickland stated that the purpose of plac-
ing the harsh burden of proof established by Chapman on the state was
"to prevent the state from benefitting from its own wrongs.""' 0 Since
the violation in an ineffective assistance of counsel case "is not caused
"[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an
impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The
right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth
Amendment .... "
'" Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Harmless Error Rule: The
Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1384, 1404 (1975).
loS Note, supra note 74, at 770.
'M 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
107 Id. at 23 & n.8 (citing right to counsel guarantee of Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), as an example of error that may never be deemed harmless).
108 Id. at 22.
109 Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
10 Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1260 (1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984).
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by the state,""' the court noted that "the same equitable and deterrent
function" of the harmless error rule is not served." 2 This is a misread-
ing of Chapman. The Chapman harmless error rule was not intended
merely as a deterrent. Rather, it represented an attempt to reach a just
result while protecting the "'substantial rights of the parties.' "'3
Thus, the fact that the state did not cause the error is irrelevant. As-
suming that the harmless error doctrine should apply to sixth amend-
ment violations, "the issue is not whether the state or the defendant was
responsible for defense counsel's actions, but whether the defendant's
sixth amendment right to effective counsel was violated."" 4 Chapman
holds only that "the beneficiary of the error[,]" that is "someone other
than the person prejudiced by it[,]" bears the burden of showing that
the error was harmless." 5 If a showing of prejudice is to be required at
all, the Court in Strickland erred in placing the burden on the defend-
ant, since this, in effect, requires the defendant to prove her innocence.
C. The Impossibility of Proving that a Jury Would
Have Reached a Different Result
The prejudice requirement enunciated in Strickland is also un-
workable on a practical level. Strickland requires a defendant to prove
"that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes-
sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."'" 6 This is an outcome-determinative test that assumes one can de-
termine what the result would have been had effective assistance of
counsel been provided. Such an assumption rejects the reasoning upon
which Gideon v. Wainwright is based. 1 7 One commentator provides a
... Id. The implication is that ineffective assistance of counsel is a different type
of procedural violation than, for example, an illegal search, since in the latter the state
is responsible for the violation.
112 Id. at 1260.
13 386 U.S. at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982)). The Court in Chapman
noted that the California State Constitution forbade reversal unless "'the court shall be
of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'"
386 U.S. at 20 (citing CAL. CONST. art VI, § 4 ). The Court also noted that the
federal statute forbade reversal for "'errors or defects which do not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties.'" Id. at 22 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1982)).
114 Note, supra note 104, at 1402. This commentator further noted, "[It] appears
illogical to charge the defendant with responsibility for the acts of his attorney; he is not
in a position to oversee his attorney's performance knowledgeably." Id. See also Brescia
v. New Jersey, 417 U.S. 921, 926 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of peti-
tion for cert.) ("No matter upon whose doorstep the judge cared to lay blame for coun-
sel's lack of preparation, the cost of the failure should not have been visited upon the
defendant-who was without responsibility.").
115 386 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
"' Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984).
11 United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 & n.5 (1972) (discussing Gideon v.
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clear example of the virtual impossibility of proving that a jury proba-
bly would have reached a different result'18 by discussing two cases
with substantially similar facts."19 In People v. Jackson, the defendant's
ninety-year old grandmother was present at the trial every day. 2 The
grandmother raised the defendant after his parents had abandoned
him. 2' The evidence showed that she loved and believed in him, 22
knowing that his parents cruelly rejected him.12 Though the grand-
mother's testimony was likely to elicit a sympathetic response from the
jury, defense counsel refused to permit her to testify."2 The jury sen-
tenced the defendant to death. In the unreported case of Bernadino
Sierra,'25 defense counsel allowed various relatives to testify. In partic-
ular, the defendant's son, "a beautiful little boy, got on the stand and
told the jury, 'That's my father.' And the lawyer asked him, 'What's
the jury going to decide?' 'Whether he lives or whether he dies,' said
the little boy."' 28 Jackson involved two killings and burglaries, and the
jury sentenced the defendant to die. Sierra involved three killings, two
maimings, and twelve robberies. The jury spared Sierra's life.'
27
On very similar facts, juries reached opposite conclusions. If any
conclusion may be deemed "reasonably probable," it is that Sierra,
whose crimes were more heinous than those committed by Jackson,
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
119 Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REy. 299 (1983).
119 "The defendants committed roughly comparable capital crimes. Both had life
histories that helped explain their crimes; both had friends or relatives willing to testify
in their favor." Id. at 302. The two cases were People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618
P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981), and the
unreported case of Bernardino Sierra (discussed in Goodpaster, supra note 118, at
300-01. The facts were taken from statements by Millard Farmer and James Kinard,
defense counsel. Farmer & Kinard, Remarks at the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association Convention, Philadelphia (1976), reported in 2 CALIF. DEATH PENALTY
MANUAL N-33 (1980)).
120 People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 326-37, 618 P.2d 149, 199-200, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 603, 653-54 (1980) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 325-26, 618 P.2d at 198-99, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
122 See id. at 334 n.11, 618 P.2d at 204 n.11, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 658 n.11 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
123 See id. at 325-26, 618 P.2d at 198-99, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
124 See id. at 334 n.11, 618 P.2d at 204 n.11, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 658 n.11 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
125 See Goodpaster, supra note 118, at 300-01 (discussing the case of Bernardino
Sierra).
126 Goodpaster, supra note 118, at 301 n.5 (citing Farmer & Mullin, Capital
Trial Emphasis on the Punishment Stage of a Case, reported in 2 CALIF. DEATH
PENALTY MANUAL, supra note 119, at N-32).
127 Goodpaster, supra note 118, at 302.
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would not have received the more lenient sentence. Proof of a reasona-
ble probability that the result would have been different is virtually
impossible since jurors' decisions are based on an infinite variety of
subjective data, and one can rarely, if ever, state that it is reasonably
probable that a jury would have reached a different result than it
did.1 28 Thus, when a defendant has been convicted in a trial in which
the effective assistance of counsel was lacking, 129 the conviction must be
overturned, even where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. 30 The
question of prejudice is inappropriate in the context of a violation of a
defendant's sixth amendment rights.
Such a conclusion may strike some as extreme. Why should a
court allow a clearly guilty defendant to escape conviction? First, such
a defendant does not escape conviction, but rather receives a new trial.
Second, in an adversarial system, one is never "clearly guilty" until one
has been convicted through fair procedures."' Stated more simply, one
is innocent until proven guilty, and guilt or innocence must be deter-
mined in a constitutionally adequate trial.1 2
IV. A MORE APPROPRIATE TEST
A. The Hybrid Test
Two predominant schools of thought exist among the courts and
commentators as to the correct standard of proof for a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel: the "categoricalists" and the "judgmental-
ists. '1' 33 Judge Leventhal noted in United States v. DeCoster [DeCoster
128 Justice Marshall objected on this ground in his dissent in Strickland: "[It is
often very difficult to tell whether a defendart convicted after a trial in which he was
ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent."
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2076 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129 As two recent commentators have noted, "Ineffective representation is the same
as no representation at all." Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 66, at 503; see also
R. TRAYNOR, JR., THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 57 (1970) (implying that the
Supreme Court has rejected any difference between the right to counsel and the right to
effective assistance of counsel) (citing Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961);
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945);
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945)). Various courts have also noted this proposi-
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865 n.1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 842 (1978); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 243-44, 393 A.2d 642, 644 (1978).
I" Note, supra note 74, at 767.
131 "The presumption of innocence that cloaks the accused cannot be stripped by a
conviction obtained in something less than a constitutionally adequate trial." United
States v. DeCoster (DeCoster II1), 624 F.2d 196, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
132 See id.
M W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, at § 11.7(c).
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III]34 that the principal distinction between the two approaches stems
"from the courts' perceptions of the exactness with which a denial [of
effective assistance] can be identified and remedied, as well as their
views of the need for a showing of prejudice."1 5 Although most courts
have chosen one approach or the other in defining a standard of ineffec-
tive assistance, Judge Leventhal, writing for the court in Decoster III,
held that the two standards represent the extremes of a continuum. 36
Judge Leventhal explained that in cases of "structural or procedural
impediments by the state that prevent the accused from receiving the
benefits of the constitutional guarantee," '137 the categorical approach
would apply. The failure of a state to appoint counsel to an indigent
defendant, thereby denying her of any counsel whatsoever, is the clear-
est example of such a procedural impediment.13 ' A violation of that
right is prejudicial per se and requires immediate reversal.1 39
At the other extreme of Judge Leventhal's continuum are cases in
which a claim of ineffective assistance is based, not on any state action,
but rather on actions or omissions by defense counsel. 40 These cases,
he argues, are not amenable to resolution by categorical approaches: 41
The defense attorney's function consists, in large part, of the
application of professional judgment to an infinite variety of
decisions in the development and prosecution of the case. A
determination whether any given action or omission by coun-
sel amounted to ineffective assistance cannot be divorced
from consideration of the peculiar facts and circumstances
that influenced counsel's judgment. 42
This type of situation, which calls for a case-by-case factual inquiry
134 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
135 Id. at 200.
1'8 See id. at 201.
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 See id. It is also noted:
Under the categorical approach, certain actions by counsel are as-
sumed to be essential to effective representation, and counsel's failure or
inability to take such action therefore automatically establishes constitu-
tional error. That error ordinarily will be treated as a per se basis for
reversal of a defendant's conviction, although some supporters of the cate-
gorical approach would modify it to permit a harmless error exception for
certain types of ineffectiveness claims.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, at § 11.7(c).
140 DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at 202.
141 See id.
142 Id. at 203; see also Note, supra note 74, at 766 ("It is true that there is some
need for flexibility in the application of appellate standards. The special facts of each
case and the strength of the prosecution's case naturally determine to some extent what
an effective attorney will do.").
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into the performance of counsel, is not amenable to categorical rules.
Although a variety of commentators and jurists have argued for
the adoption of a categorical approach,1 43 few courts have adopted such
an approach.1 44 Because each attorney is different and each trial situa-
tion is unique, categorical rules are deemed inappropriate. 45 Thus,
most courts have accepted the judgmental notion that claims of ineffec-
tiveness of counsel must be judged on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
the totality of the circumstances.
146
This Comment has argued that the judgmental approach to inef-
fective assistance cases adopted by the Court in Strickland v. Washing-
143 See, e.g., Note, supra note 74, at 767-70. Judge Bazelon has been a strong
proponent of the categorical approach:
[Counsel] . . . must confer with his client without delay and as often as
necessary to elicit matters of defense, discuss fully potential strategies and
tactical choices with his client, properly advise his client of his rights and
take all actions necessary to preserve them, and conduct appropriate inves-
tigations, both factual and legal. Precisely because these rules are so ele-
mentary, no one can dispute that a 'reasonable' lawyer, absent good cause,
would comply with them.
Bazelon, supra note 64, at 823 (citations omitted); see also DeCoster III, 624 F.2d at
304-06 (Bazelon, C.J., opinion on remand) (arguing for categorical approach to be
guided by the ABA Standards for the Defense Function (ABA PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-1.1 to -8.6 (Tent. Draft 1979))).
144 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, at § 11.7(c). Those who support the
categorical approach generally contend that the American Bar Association Standards
for the Defense Function provide appropriate rules. See supra note 143. Various courts
have held, however, that the imposition of ABA standards would affect the adversary
system by interfering with the defense function. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 512 (1976) (holding that once a defendant has the assistance of counsel "the vast
array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during
trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the
duties of trial judges and counsel in our legal system.").
One commentator found two flaws in the argument that standards would interfere
with the adversary system:
First, the adversary system presumes attorney competence. If defense
counsel incompetence renders that assumption false, the structure of the
system is jeopardized. Categorical rules to upgrade attorney performance
may help ensure the presence of effective adversaries . . . . Second, soci-
ety has an interest in the criminal process beyond preserving the institu-
tional structure and guaranteeing accuracy of result. If fairness in the ad-
judication of criminal guilt were not a paramount concern, inquisition of
the obviously guilty would be sufficient. This concern sometimes dictates
that a guilty verdict be overturned, notwithstanding overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt, because the procedure for obtaining the verdict was unfair.
This is one rationale behind the exclusionary rule, for example.
Note, supra note 74, at 767 (footnotes omitted).
145 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 71, at § 11.7(c) ("Counsel's
action or inaction as to a particular matter must be judged in the context of his total
representation . . ").
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ton fails to meet the requirements of the sixth amendment. The cate-
gorical approach, requiring rigid rules for attorney behavior at trial, 47
is also inadequate. Although a reviewing court cannot smother a de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights in a veil of tactical decisions by de-
fense counsel, the Court in Strickland makes a strong point in noting,
"No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfacto-
rily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense coun-
sel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent
a criminal defendant. 1 48 Categoricalists are correct, however, in argu-
ing that, once a defendant proves that counsel was constitutionally inef-
fective, the defendant need not show prejudice.
Thus, this Comment suggests a hybrid approach. First, as in the
judgmental approach, a defendant must prove that counsel failed to
make decisions that were objectively reasonable in light of all of the
circumstances of the case. An objectively reasonable decision is one that
is commensurate with the prevailing notion of a competent attorney.
Courts have applied this "range of competence" standard and have
found it to be a viable means of determining effectiveness of representa-
tion.149 Second, as in the categorical approach, once a defendant meets
the burden of proof with respect to counsel's actions,. the defendant
need not prove more. The denial of the effective assistance of counsel is
prejudicial per se.
Any assessment of attorney competence must occur in the context
of the adversary system:
On any theory of the adversary system the lawyers should be
competent in the law and in trial skills. One may be inclined
to go further and say that if a trial is to be fair, the lawyers
should be equal in competence, or at least not too disparate
in respect to competence. When either of these conditions of
competence or rough equality of competence is not met, the
judge will be faced with a serious problem regarding proce-
dural justice.
150
Unfortunately, the ideal world of equally competent attorneys does not
147 See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
148 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).
140 See, e.g., Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (discussing the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970)
("normal competency: the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which nor-
mally prevails at the time and place"); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17
(D.C. Cir. 1967) ("gross incompetence of counsel . . . has in effect blotted out the
essence of a substantial defense").
150 Golding, supra note 4, at 115.
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exist. Consequently, the goal must be to ensure that opposing litigants
have counsel who are as nearly equal in competence as possible. The
proposed reasonableness test, under which an attorney's decisions must
be judged in light of the prevailing notion of a competent attorney, is
directed at such a result. This test is appropriate for two reasons. First,
it recognizes that lawyers are professionals and should be judged by the
same standards that courts have used to judge other professionals.
151 If
a judge is competent to determine whether a professional other than a
lawyer acted reasonably, she is certainly capable of determining
whether a lawyer acted reasonably.1 52 Second, this test adequately pro-
tects reasonable tactical decisions. Responding to the Court's admoni-
tion in Strickland that "every effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight," ' this test asks not whether an attorney's deci-
sions were correct but rather whether they were objectively reasonable
under all the circumstances.
Once a defendant proves that counsel was constitutionally ineffec-
tive, the defendant need not prove prejudice. To do so would presume a
defendant to be guilty although the defendant had never been proven
guilty through proper procedures. Nor should the state be permitted to
prove harmless error. To do so would be to propose that a trial, which
is by definition unfair, can be accepted as fair.'" The Court in Chap-
man v. California noted that certain constitutional violations, including
the denial of the right of counsel, can never be deemed harmless.1 55 As
151 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 185-86 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) states:
Professional persons in general, and those who undertake any work calling
for special skill, are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what
they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and
ability. Most of the decided cases have dealt with surgeons and other doc-
tors, but the same is undoubtedly true of dentists, pharmacists, psychia-
trists, veterinarians, lawyers . . . architects and engineers . . . and
many other professionals and skilled trades.
152 In discussing the irony of judges holding other professionals to a reasonable-
ness standard while applying the less stringent "gross incompetence" or "mockery of
justice" standards in effective representation cases, Judge Bazelon noted: "Judges who
never would even think to apply these tests [i.e. variety of ineffective assistance tests] to
other professions have ignored gross incompetence among lawyers. Who would be con-
tent with their doctor because he did not make a mockery of medicine, or was not
grossly incompetent?" Bazelon, supra note 64, at 819 (footnote omitted).
1 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).
Arguably, a plausible justification for the harmless error rule is the courts'
concern with severely crowded dockets. Such a justification indicates that where a court
applies the harmless error doctrine, the court does not deem an unfair trial fair, but
rather it deems an unfair trial a necessary evil: unfair but acceptable under all of the
circumstances.
155 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967). The Court in Chapman cited Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel), Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
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the Court noted in Strickland, the denial of the effective assistance of
counsel is equivalent to the denial of any counsel. 15' Thus, the denial of
the effective assistance of counsel should never be deemed harmless.
B. Judicial Economy at What Cost?
Although ensuring that the efficient administration of criminal jus-
tice and the integrity of final judgments are proper interests for a court
to consider, they should not be determinative considerations when the
judgment sought to be preserved is unfair at the outset. 15 7 The Court in
Strickland placed particular emphasis on both of these concerns. First,
the Court stated that allowing for too intrusive a post-trial inquiry into
counsel's assistance "would encourage the proliferation of ineffective-
ness challenges."'1 58 Even if this were true, it must be viewed as an
unfortunate but necessary result of giving the sixth amendment "real
bite."11 5 9 Where a defendant has been denied effective assistance of
counsel, the trial was not a fair one, and the conviction must be over-
turned. Second, the Court in Strickland noted the presumption that a
criminal judgment is final.1 60 As efficiency concerns should not deny a
defendant a fair trial, neither should concerns for finality. An unjust
conviction cannot be upheld solely in the interest of the finality of the
proceeding, for the ultimate goal of a criminal justice system is to do
justice in all cases.
Implicit in the Court's emphasis in Strickland on efficiency and
finality is the notion that a test that protects absolutely a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel would be untenable or, at best,
impractical.1" Experience shows otherwise, for courts have successfully
(1958) (coerced confession), and Tunney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial
judge) as examples of cases where the harmless error doctrine would be inapplicable.
15 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). A defendant must
show that the counsel made errors so serious that she was not functioning as the coun-
sel guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
157 Note, supra note 74, at 769.
158 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
.. Bazelon, supra note 64, at 821. In fact, a more stringent standard might, in
the long run, prove to be a more effective way of meeting the concerns of the Court in
Strickland. "[Cilarifying the requirements for defense counsel might well reduce the
number of ineffectiveness claims by informing defendants and lawyers alike as to what
is expected of counsel. In any event, such clarification would make it easier for courts to
separate frivolous from nonfrivolous ineffectiveness issues." Id. at 822.
160 Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070 (1984).
181 Writing for the Court in Strickland, Justice O'Connor stated:
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance
or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the prolifera-
tion of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to
the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial,
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applied standards like those proposed by this Comment to distinguish
unreasonable from reasonable attorney conduct. For example, courts
have found defense counsel's conduct to be unreasonable where counsel
did not participate at all at trial, choosing instead to stand mute,
162
where counsel did not interview any witnesses, ' and where counsel
failed to conduct any investigation into the client's only possible de-
fense164 or into a potentially fruitful line of defense.1 "5 On the other
hand, courts have found defense counsel's actions reasonable where de-
fense counsel refused to file affidavits of proposed testimony because to
do so would create the risk of a perjury charge against the client and
alert the prosecution to matters helpful to the prosecution on retrial. 6
The test proposed by this Comment also enables judges to decide
cases with results as clear as the cases noted above. For example, in
Easter v. Estelle, 67 the defendant claimed that counsel's failure to in-
terview and subpoena certain witnesses constituted a denial of effective
assistance of counsel. This case is more difficult than the situation in
which counsel interviews no witnesses at all. The court found counsel's
actions reasonable, noting that the course of action suggested by the
defendant would have "opened the door to the introduction of [defend-
ant's] prior conviction for child molestation" and, consequently, would
have weakened the defense.16
this one of counsel's unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance or even
willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of coun-
sel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ar-
dor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the accept-
ance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and
client.
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066 (1984).
162 Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir. 1984).
183 Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868
(1976).
I" See, e.g., United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659, 668 (3d Cir. 1982) (where
government's entire case rested on an intercepted phone conversation and where gov-
ernment's chief piece of evidence was a voice exemplar of defendant's voice, defense
counsel's failure to listen to the voice exemplar, a course of action which might have
produced exculpatory evidence, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Gomez v.
Beto, 462 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1972) (where defendant notified defense counsel of
various alibi witnesses and where defendant's alibi was his only line of defense, defense
counsel's failure to investigate into these alibi witnesses constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel).
1'5 Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1148 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (where
defendant informed defense counsel that the murder of which he was accused was pro-
voked, failure of defense counsel to investigate this claim constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel).
188 United States v. Lauga, 762 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 173 (1985).
187 609 F.2d 756, 759 (5th Cir. 1980).
168 Id.
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Carbo v. United States 69 provides another example of a difficult
case that could be managed capably using the standard proposed by this
Comment. In Carbo, the defendant claimed that he was denied the ef-
fective assistance of counsel because counsel was appointed on the day
of the guilty plea and was given only five minutes to discuss the case
with the defendant. 170 The defendant argued that, in light of these
facts, counsel could not have been adequately prepared. 17 ' The Carbo
court rejected the defendant's claim after analyzing the particular set-
ting of the case. Noting that in the context of a guilty plea, defense
counsel need only ensure that the plea was entered "voluntarily and
knowingly,"'' 72 the court held that the time counsel expended on the
case was sufficient.' 73
The test proposed in this Comment provides a viable alternative to
the Strickland test for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
proposed test both recognizes and protects the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. It does not permit a court to engage in a prejudice
inquiry that allows that court to reach the paradoxical conclusion that
although the defendant has not had the benefit of effective assistance of
counsel, the trial result can stand.
CONCLUSION
The sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is
indispensable to an adversarial system of justice that defines a fair trial
as one in which an accused's procedural rights are protected. In Strick-
land v. Washington, the Supreme Court admitted that a fair trial is
defined "through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment"'u 4
but proceeded to fashion a test for ineffective assistance of counsel that
sacrifices the explicit rights stated in the sixth amendment on a judi-
cially created altar of fairness. Once an accused proves that counsel was
not "the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend-
ment[,]' '1 5 Strickland requires that the defendant further overcome the
presumption that the trial was fair. Where the procedural rights guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment define a fair trial and where one of
those procedural rights, namely the right to counsel, is denied, the trial
must be deemed unfair. The denial of a constitutionally adequate trial
169 581 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1978).
17o See id. at 93.
171 See id.
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984).
175 Id. at 2064.
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is prejudicial per se. Thus, once a defendant proves a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Because the procedural rights enunciated in the sixth amendment
ensure the fair operation of an adversarial system of justice, a test for
ineffective assistance of counsel must be based on the needs of that sys-
tem. The test proposed in this Comment is so grounded. Such a test
might very well induce defendants to challenge the effectiveness of the
assistance of their counsel. The possibility of a resulting burden on the
court dockets is real. This does not, however, justify denying a defend-
ant one of the sixth amendment procedural guarantees that collectively
define a fair trial. When one of those protections is denied a criminal
defendant, the trial is unfair and a new trial should be required.

